Contracts: Negotiating Attorneys Fee Awards

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

In America, each party generally pays its own expenses when going to court. This can be a deterrent to litigation when the amount to be recovered is not very large and the prospect of success is not high. But, if attorneys fees are available as part of the recovery, this may tip the scale in favor of pursuing the claim.

There are a handful of statutes that award attorneys fees to a successful litigant. They are mostly what are called “remedial statutes”, created for the purpose of correcting a condition deemed to be unjust to a protected class of persons. Federal civil rights statutes fall into the category, as do some state and federal consumer statutes. For example, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law, the subject of PLBT’s most recent Landlord-tenant post, authorizes the court to award attorneys fees to a successful plaintiff. In some of these statutes, the plaintiff is referred to as a “private attorney general” and the award of attorneys fees is deemed, in part, a reward for bringing benefits to other members of the public.

Another example is the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act. The legislature undoubtedly felt that the bargaining power between the contractor and the subcontractor was grossly unequal and sought to motivate the contractor to pay subs on time by creating penalties, including an award of attorneys fees, if the subcontractor was required to sue.

Other awards of attorneys fees are found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, awarding sanctions against a party who disregards an order of court or certain duties under the Rules.

But statutes and rules of court which award attorneys fees are rather few in number and do not come into play in the vast majority of cases. Moreover, if you or your client are not one of those underdogs for whom the congress or legislature seeks to level the playing field, you are on your own.

However, all is not lost. The best and most reliable way to provide for attorneys fees in litigation is by contract.

The good news is that this benefit is often available for the asking. When the parties are feeling friendly and there are no disputes on the horizon, a contract provision that awards attorneys fees when a litigant has to go to court to collect money or assert other contractual rights will often attract no attention at all. It may even seem fair to the adverse party, who thinks that such a circumstances is so remote that it doesn’t matter.

When the other party, who holds most of the cards and will be collecting money from you or your client, is proposing this contract term and won’t budge, there is usually a way to make the deal better. Don’t let the other side collect attorneys fees unless the claim is successful and counter-propose that the losing side pay the attorneys fees of the prevailing party. The other party, who at this point expects to win all disputes, will often cheerfully agree. After all, fair is fair. But when the dispute arises, he/she/it may hesitate to bring a doubtful claim for fear of paying rather than collecting attorneys fees. This, in turn, improves the prospects of an advantageous settlement.

On the other hand, if the other party insists on getting attorneys fees win or lose, perhaps you are getting into the wrong deal. Review the whole contract for other one-sided provisions.

Sometimes a fixed amount or a cap on attorneys fees can be proposed. A stated high hourly rate (like $250/hour and up — what big law firms typically charge) can be a deal breaker. The word “reasonable” in front of “attorneys fees” (not an oxymoron, take my word) can postpone that issue to the day when a judge or arbitrator must decide the question. Judges will probably try to determine what the prevailing attorneys fee for conducting litigation of similar difficulty and importance in the jurisdiction might be. The size of the potential recovery would play a major role in this determination. If the amount in dispute runs into the millions, the proposed $250/hour rate is likely to seem reasonable to the judge. Not so for a $5,000.00 case.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Real Estate: Q: What is the 2008 equivalent of a $50,000 mortgage in 1974? A: $217,837.

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

In 1974, Pennsylvania enacted an important piece of consumer protection legislation known as Act 6 of 1974. It defined a “Residential Mortgage”, as “an obligation to pay a principal sum of $50,000.00 or less evidenced by a security document and secured by a lien upon real property located within this Commonwealth containing two or fewer residential units . . .”

Among other provisions, Act 6 prohibited prepayment penalties upon Residential Mortgages. At the time, a $50,000 mortgage was considered to be quite substantial and I often heard the statement that someone who borrowed more than $50,000 could look after himself.

As times changed, the $50,000 figure became an anachronism. However, there was no strong movement to update the limit. Community banks, thrifts and credit unions typically did not charge prepayment penalties, even on residential loans much larger than the statutory amount.

But when the residential mortgage market was taken over by national lenders who typically sold loans to securitized pools, prepayment penalties became standard. Few loans were under $50,000 and many out-of-state lenders either didn’t know about Act 6 or simply ignored it.

That changed on July 8, 2008 when the Legislature enacted Act 57 of 2008, which became effective in 60 days — early in September. The statutory definition of a Residential Mortgage is now tied to inflation and will be updated annually by the Pennsylvania Department of Banking. In 2008 a “base figure” of $217,873 applies. I suppose that today you might say that anyone who can get a mortgage for more than $217,873 can look after himself or herself. A lot of things have changed since 1974.

It remains to be seen whether prepayment penalties on mortgages over $50,000 but under $217,873 written before September 2008 are enforceable. However, as real estate lawyers will tell you, residential house sales can’t wait for courts to decide such questions. Sellers will have to pay the penalty or lose the deal and so, will probably pay. Moreover, chances are excellent that national lenders are not planning to change their mortgage forms — they usually pay attention to changes in federal but not state law. Expect them to argue that loans without prepayment penalties do not qualify for pooling programs. Expect them to threaten to discontinue their most attractive residential lending programs if the prohibition is not abolished.

If the Act 6 prohibition is to be enforced, it is up to the Department of Banking and the Attorney General to do it. For the sake of Pennsylvania consumers, here’s hoping they do.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Landlord-Tenant: Double Damages? Peanuts! Give me Triple!

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

As readers of earlier posts know, the Landlord and Tenant Act states that if the tenant provides a forwarding address and landlord keeps the security deposit and fails to give the tenant a list of damages in 30 days after the premises are delivered, the tenant may claim double damages.

However, there are circumstances when a Pennsylvania statute known as the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL” or “Consumer Protection Law”) [73 P.S. Sec. 203.1 et seq.] can yield triple damages, plus attorneys fees. The UTPCPL provides:

“Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 3 of this Act, may bring a private action to recover actual damages or one hundred dolars ($100), whichever is greater.”

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the UTPCPL could be applied to apartment leasing a generation ago in Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974). That case was brought by the Attorney General against 25 landlords who used printed lease forms containing provisions which the Attorney General characterized as unfair and deceptive. Four printers and distributers of the documents were also named as defendants. The Supreme Court held that the Consumer Protection Law covers unfair or deceptive practices in connection of leasing of housing to consumers.

Then, in Zimmerman v. National Apartment Leasing Company, 108 Pa. Commw. 300, 529 A.2d 1157 (1987), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the Consumer Protection Law could be applied to allegations that a landlord had repeatedly charged tenants’ security deposits for cleaning services that were not necessary.

In 1999, the Superior Court applied the Consumer Protection Law when a landlord claimed a large and unjustified amount of damages. In Wallace v. Pastore, 1999 Pa. Super. 297, 742 A.2d 1090 (1999), the landlord argued that UTPCPL applied only in cases involving repeated or frequent action, as in Monumental Properties and National Apartment Leasing, while the case before the court involved only a single incident.

The Superior Court noted that “unfair and deceptive practices” under the UTPCPL included: “knowingly misrepresenting that services, replacements or repairs are needed if they are not needed.” There was no requirement in the statute that Plaintiff prove that this was a repeated practice, or that it could not be applied to a single isolated event. “In the present case,” the Superior Court wrote,”the trial court found that Pastore knowingly misrepresented to Wallace and Redante that they owed thousands of dollars in repairs and labor.” That finding alone established a violation of UTPCPL.

The Consumer Protection Law contains a series of specific factual circumstances when the statute may be applied, including through recent amendment, a “catch-all” provision: “engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a liklihood of confusion or of misunderstanding” (Sec. 201-2(4)(xxi). This provision, while expanding the scope of UTPCPL, is held by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to require strict proof of all of the elements of common law fraud. This in turn, creates a substantial burden of proof on the Plaintiff and has lead to the demise of numerous Consumer Protection Law cases based on the catch-all provision where one or more of the elements of common law fraud could not be proven.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Increase in Deposit Insurance: The Silver Lining

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

The proposed increase in FDIC Insurance to $250,000.00 per account is coming about under the worst circumstances, but just in time. Increased deposits in insured institutions will mean more money for community banks, credit unions and thrifts to lend for home loans, small business loans and consumer loans. While the Senate enacted it last night as a temporary measure, we predict that the House will adopt the increase in deposit insurance and it will never be permitted to lapse.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Trick Questions for Sarah

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

With the Vice Presidential Debate coming up, there has been speculation in certain quarters that Governor Sarah Palin will not be able to hold up her end of the debate. Why? Most of us didn’t know the Bush Doctrine from the Defenestration of Prague before Charles Gibson launched that torpedo. Most of us still don’t.

Amid all this speculation, CBS has been accused of leaking one segment of a yet-to-be-broadcast interview in which the Republican Vice Presidential candidate was unable to name any US Supreme Court case except Roe v. Wade.

What is going on here? Does the fact that Palin, a non-lawyer, might someday be President and thus nominating members of the judiciary, justify this kind of vetting? And is it meaningful? [Quick — name a US Supreme Court case!] Perhaps her rival, Senator Biden, who might someday appoint a future Secretary of the Interior, should also be given a quiz on Alaskan wildlife and natural resources. Of course, that won’t happen. It wouldn’t be as much fun as picking on little Sarah.

However, in the spirit of the game, I have put together a few unfair questions about the Supreme Court that might be used to try to embarrass anyone.

Q: What is the issue raised in Locke v. Karass, scheduled to be the second of three cases to be heard by the United States Supreme Court on October 6?

A: This case addresses whether a public-sector union may include litigation costs, funded through pooling arrangements with other unions, in the service fee it charges non-members. Click here for more on this fascinating subject.

Q: In the case of Clevenger v. Cutlar, currently in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, jurisdiction was asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). What is a Bivens action?

A: In this case the United States Supreme Court held that an individual has an implied cause of action when his/her Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is violated by federal agents. If you don’t believe it, or maybe you do, click here.

Q: What is the holding in the Landmark Supreme Court Case of Marbury v. Madison and why is it important?

A: Marbury v. Madison held Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional, since Congress cannot enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond that permitted by the Constitution. This case is credited with establishing the principle of judicial review of Acts of Congress. To improve your education on Constitutional Law, click here.

Q: Some Congressional critics of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 expressed concern that that the Bush proposal would represent an unconstitutional delegation of spending powers granted to Congress by Article I of the US Constitution. What is Article I about?

A: Too long — click here.

And one more:

Q: How many types of Polar Bears are there in Alaska?

A: Look it up. Click here.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Landlord-Tenant: Much Ado About Security Deposits.

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

What happens when a landlord gives back a tenant’s security deposit and subsequently sues for damages? Thirty days have passed and no list of damages was given by the landlord to the tenant. Does this failure to provide a list of damages bar recovery pursuant to Section 512(b) of the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951?

Section 512(b) states:

“(b) Any landlord who fails to provide a written list within 30 days as required in subsection (a), above, shall forfeit all rights to withhold any portion of sums held in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the leasehold premises.”

Seems pretty clear, doesn’t it? No list – no suit!

Read on.

These circumstances arose in Allegheny County Common Pleas Court, in the case of Bonfield v. Cassler, 16 D&C. 3d 716 (1980), decided by Judge R. Stanton Wettick. Judge Wettick held that the failure of the landlord to give notice under these facts did not preclude recovery.

Judge Wettick reasoned that the 30 day list requirement was not intended by the Legislature to apply to a landlord who had already given back the security deposit. Reading Section 512 (a) (b) and (c) together, he stated, indicated that the intention of the statute was to assure that tenants either received a list of damages or the security deposit in 30 days. The prohibition against suit, read in the context of the entire section only made sense when the landlord was keeping the security deposit. Now read the entire section:

“(a) Every landlord shall within 30 days of termination of a lease or upon surrender and acceptance of the leasehold premises, whichever first occurs, provide a tenant with a written list of any damages to the leasehold premises for which the landlord claims the tenant is liable. Delivery of the list shall be accompanied by payment of the difference between any sum deposited in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, for the payment of damages to the leasehold premises and the actual amount of damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant. Nothing in this section shall preclude the landlord from refusing to return the escrow fund, including any unpaid interest thereon, for non-payment of rent or for the breach of any other condition in the lease by the tenant.

“(c) If the landlord fails to pay the tenant the difference between the sum deposited, including any unpaid interest thereon, and the actual damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant within 30 days after termination of the lease or surrender and acceptance of the leasehold premises, the landlord shall be liable in assumpsit to double the amount by which the sum deposited in escrow, including any unpaid interest thereon, exceeds the actual damages to the leasehold premises caused by the tenant as determined by any court of record or court not of record having jurisdiction in civil actions at law. The burden of proof of actual damages caused by the tenant to the leasehold premises shall be on the landlord.”

Judge Wettick observed that the statute made available a penalty against the landlord (double net damages) when the landlord keeps the money for damages without providing the list. But if the security deposit is relinquished in the thirty days, the purpose of the statute has been fulfilled. So, if the landlord delivers either the deposit or the list, there is no penalty.

Okay, but what happens if the security deposit is $100.00 and the damages are $1,000.00? Once again, the landlord fails to give written notice of damages within 30 days. But he also keeps the deposit. Does the holding in Bonfield v. Cassler apply here?

Yes, Judge Wettick decided this case, too. See Taylor v. Fitzhenry, 48 Pa. D&C. 3d619 (1987). His analysis is a bit complex, but no one can state it better. Moreover, any lawyer venturing into Judge Wettick’s courtroom to argue about security deposits is in serious danger if he or she has not mastered Taylor v. Fitzhenry. The opinion states:

“We recognize that the language of subsection 512(b) forfeiting the right of the landlord who fails to provide a written list “to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the leasehold premises” suggests that the landlord who fails to provide a written list may not sue the tenant for any damages to the leasehold premises. But the language of subsection 512(c) making the landlord liable for ‘double the amount by which the sum deposited in escrow . . . exceeds the actual damages to the leasehold premises’ suggests that the landlord who retains the security deposit and fails to provide a written list may fully defeat the claim of a tenant for the return of the security deposit by proving actual damages to the leasehold premises in an amount equal to or in excess of the security deposit. Such a result would provide very little incentive to a landlord to furnish a written list of damages to the tenant because the landlord who fails to do so would be treated in almost the same manner as the landlord who provides the written list. Both classes of landlords could defeat a claim for the return of the security deposit by showing that the tenant caused damages in an amount at least equal to the amount of the security deposit. Both classes of landlords would be liable for double the amount of proceeds withheld in excess of actual damages to the rental premises. Under this construction of section 512, the only difference between these classes of landlords would be that the landlord who provides the written list may sue for damages to the leasehold premises in excess of the amount of the security deposit while the landlord who fails to provide the written list cannot do so.

Landlords obtain security deposits because they do not expect to be able to collect a judgment from a tenant after the premises are vacated, so we would be giving very little incentive to the landlord who keeps the security deposit to provide a written list of damages to the tenant if the only penalty for the failure to provide the written list is forfeiture of a right to sue the tenant. As we discussed in Bonifield v. Cassler, supra, section 512 was intended to protect tenants by requiring landlords who keep security deposits as payment for damage to the leasehold premises to provide written lists of damages. This can be achieved only by construing section 512 in a manner that provides a remedy to the tenant whenever a landlord who keeps any portion of the security deposit for this purpose fails to furnish a written list of damages.

We can accomplish this result if we construe subsections 512(b) and 512(c) in a manner which gives primary emphasis to the portion of subsection 512(b) which states that the landlord who fails to provide the list ‘shall forfeit all rights to withhold any portion of sums held in escrow.’ If this portion of subsection 512(b) is intended to provide for the return of the full amount of the security deposit whenever the landlord fails to provide the list, then the subsequent portion of subsection 512(b) forfeiting the landlord’s right ‘to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the leasehold premises’ is intended only to prevent the landlord from raising a claim for damages to the leasehold premises for purposes of defeating the tenant’s claim for the return of the security deposit. If we construe subsection 512(b) in this fashion, we can then construe subsection 512(c) as permitting evidence of damages to the premises to be introduced only for purposes of barring the claim for double recovery. Illustration: The landlord did not provide a list of damages and withheld a $ 1,000 security deposit as payment for damages to the premises. The tenant sues for double the amount of the security deposit under subsection 512(c). The landlord shows actual damages to the premises of $ 900. The tenant is entitled to keep the full amount of the security deposit because of the landlord’s failure to provide a list of damages ($ 1,000) plus a partial double recovery in the amount of the security deposit ($ 1,000) less actual damages ($ 900) for a total recovery of $ 1,100.

Under this construction of subsections 512(b) and 512(c), a landlord who keeps the security deposit and fails to provide a written list may sue for damages to the leasehold premises but may not defeat a tenant’s counterclaim for the amount of the security deposit by showing damages to the premises. Illustration: The landlord did not provide a list of damages and withheld a $ 1,000 security deposit as payment for damages to the premises. The landlord, who continues to retain the security deposit, sues for damages to the premises in the amount of $ 10,000. The tenant counterclaims for double the amount of the security deposit. If the landlord proves actual damages to the premises of $ 10,000, the landlord will recover this full amount on his or her claim for damages to the premises. The tenant will recover $ 1,000 on his or her claim for the return of the security deposit because the landlord kept the security deposit and failed to provide a list of damages.”However, the tenant’s claim for double recovery will be defeated because the actual damages exceed the amount of the security deposit. Consequently, the landlord’s total recovery will be $ 9,000.

This construction of section 512 gives meaning to the forfeiture provision of subsection 512(b). It gives incentive to the landlord to provide a written list of damages in every case. It provides a uniform remedy for failure to provide a written list of damages of the amount of the security deposit that was withheld for payment of damages to the premises.

Finally, this construction of section 512 avoids a result which is unreasonable and inconsistent with the legislative purposes. The legislature could not have intended to permit a tenant who destroyed a $ 100,000 premise to defeat a damage claim by showing that the landlord had retained a $ 100 security deposit and had failed to provide a written list of damages. See Secretary of Revenue v. John’s Vending Corp., 453 Pa. 488, 309 A.2d 358 (1973), where the court stated, ‘In order to avoid an absurd and harsh result, a court may look beyond the strict letter of the law to interpret a statute according to its reason and spirit and accomplish the object intended by the legislature.’ The purpose of this legislation was not to reward those tenants who caused the most destruction to the premises. To the contrary, the provisions of subsection 512(c) barring double recovery to the extent that actual damages were sustained show that the legislature intended to give greater protection to the tenant who did not damage the premises.”

In my example above, where the security deposit was $100.00 and the damages were $1,000.00, Judge Wettick would award the tenant the security deposit of $100.00 (because the list of damages was not given) but no double damages. The landlord would also be able to counterclaim for $1,000.00. So the net recovery by the landlord is $900.00. This penalizes the landlord for not providing the list, but still permits a recovery of actual damages.

Are these two cases the law in Pennsylvania? Probably not — at least not yet. To my knowledge, Taylor v. Fitzhenry has not been cited in any published opinion. I doubt whether Magisterial District Justices, who hear the overwhelming majority of such cases, are inclined to interprete Section 512 (b) any way but literally. That having been said, if you are representing a landlord, one or both of these cases, with the finely tuned arguments of one of the best judges on the bench, may help keep you from being shut out from recovering damages.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Can you handle the Truth? Economics 1001 in a Nutshell.

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

Here is a concise Q&A on the current economic upheaval as guest posted on the Freakonomics blog by two experts from the University of Chicago School of Economics. Required reading during a week when the words “since the Great Depression” are starting to appear everywhere. Click here.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Criminal Law: A Matter of First Impression

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

Once again, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog featured a case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. District Judge Terrance McVerry held that cell phone records sought by police for the purpose of establishing the whereabouts of a suspect require a warrant. Here is the WSJLB story.

Judge McVerry, as many Pittsburghers undoubtedly remember, was, during the late 60’s and early seventies, himself a prosecutor and thus no stranger to the point of view of law enforcement agencies. He then served the South Hills area for many years in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, held a seat on the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas and was the Allegheny County Solicitor.

According to the Washington Post article embedded in the WSJ Post, this particular question has not been decided and the United States Attorney, Mary Beth Buchanan is considering an appeal to the Third Circuit.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

LANDLORD-TENANT MONTH: SEE HOW YOU SCORE IN THIS QUIZ ON PENNSYLVANIA LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

September is hereby declared to be Landlord-Tenant Month on Pittsburgh Legal Back Talk. Check your knowledge of basic LL/TT law in this little True and False Quiz. Then, watch this blog every day for articles about the topics covered by this Quiz and more. Make a record of your answers to these ten questions before checking the Official Answers.

1. Matters arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 are under the jurisdiction of the Magisterial District Judge unless the amount claimed is over $8,000.00.
T or F

2. A plaintiff before the Magisterial District Judge may waive the portion of his claim over $8,000.00 to retain jurisdiction with the Magisterial District Judge.
T or F

3. If the defendant appeals the final order of the Magisterial District Judge, any waiver of the claim over $8,000.00 is automatically wiped out.
T or F

4. Wages, salaries and commissions of individuals in the hands of an employer may be attached or levied for unpaid rent to satisfy an unpaid judgment for rent.
T or F

5. Military personnel, including members of the Pennsylvania National Guard, have a right to early termination of a residential lease if they receive change of station orders for a period of over three months.
T or F

6. A landlord may require up to two months rent as a security deposit during the first year of a lease, but only one month security deposit in the second year.
T or F

7. All security deposits over $100.00 must be deposited in an insured bank account.
T or F

8. If a landlord fails to provide a written list of damages to a tenant within 30 days following termination of the lease or surrender of the premises, the landlord loses his right to sue for damages.
T or F

9. If the landlord does not pay the tenant the difference between the damages to the premises and the security deposit within 30 days after termination of the lease or surrender of the premises, the landlord will be liable to the tenant for double the difference.
T or F

10. A mobile home park owner must refund the installation or removal cost to the tenant of a mobile home space at the time the space is recovered or be liable to the tenant for treble their amount plus treasonable attorneys fees.
T or F

The Official Answers can be found in the first entry in Comments. While you are there, leave a comment to disagree with an answer, ask a question or suggest a Landlord-Tenant topic you would like to see discussed this month.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

Back Talk Requested: A Chip on Your Shoulder?

Posted by Cliff Tuttle

The following item appeared this morning in the New York Times on line:

“INTERNAL G.P.S. First, tracking devices were installed in cars so they could be found if stolen. Then, pet owners began putting chips in their dogs and cats. Now it’s human beings who are being “chipped.” An epidemic of kidnappings has led wealthy and even middle-class Mexicans to pay $4,000 to have tiny transmitters implanted that can pinpoint their location by satellite.

Chipping people has already begun in the United States, where VeriChip has inserted chips in 200 Alzheimer’s patients for a pilot program. Future Big Brother applications are not hard to imagine, like chipping prisoners, the mentally ill and teenagers who lie about where they’re really spending Friday night.”

Of course, house arrest is enforced by the wearing of bracelets that perform the same purpose. These prisoners consent voluntarily, just for the privilege of serving the period of incarceration at home. Lawyers are aware that it is possible to obtain the “voluntary” agreement of people to rather onerous contract terms when the alternative is worse. It is not hard to imagine many situations where people will agree to be chipped in exchange for something and thus, not strictly against their will. That teenager, for example, can either stay home or be chipped — his choice.

Even when voluntary, it just doesn’t seem right, does it? Should we permit people to voluntarily consent to such an invasion of their body? Who should be permitted to relinquish so much privacy? Would you agree to be chipped in exchange for something you really need? Like a job? Like a life-saving operation?

Back Talk is requested. Leave a comment.

CLT

Category: Uncategorized

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Welcome

CLIFF TUTTLE has been a Pennsylvania lawyer for over 45 years and (inter alia) is a real estate litigator and legal writer. The posts in this blog are intended to provide general information about legal topics of interest to lawyers and consumers with a Pittsburgh and Western Pennsylvania focus. However, this information does not constitute legal advice and there is no lawyer-client relationship created when you read this blog. You are encouraged to leave comments but be aware that posted comments can be read by others. If you wish to contact me in privacy, please use the Contact Form located immediately below this message. I will reply promptly and in strict confidence.

Pittsburgh Legal Back Talk

Legal topics of interest to lawyers and consumers with a Pittsburgh and Western Pennsylvania focus.

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Categories

Contracts: Negotiating Attorneys Fee Awards

Real Estate: Q: What is the 2008 equivalent of a $50,000 mortgage in 1974? A: $217,837.

Landlord-Tenant: Double Damages? Peanuts! Give me Triple!

Increase in Deposit Insurance: The Silver Lining

Trick Questions for Sarah

Landlord-Tenant: Much Ado About Security Deposits.

Can you handle the Truth? Economics 1001 in a Nutshell.

Criminal Law: A Matter of First Impression

LANDLORD-TENANT MONTH: SEE HOW YOU SCORE IN THIS QUIZ ON PENNSYLVANIA LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW

Back Talk Requested: A Chip on Your Shoulder?

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